A profile built around technology, fundraising and investment.

Andrew Tan Yan Hoang is a Malaysian businessman reportedly originating from Batu Pahat, Johor.

According to a profile published by The Edge Malaysia, Andrew completed a master’s degree in International Trading and E-Commerce at Queen Mary University of London in 2003.

He said that he worked for eBay in the United Kingdom for approximately three years before returning to Malaysia. Andrew subsequently claimed that he founded a mobile-content company and took it to an IPO on MESDAQ in 2006, established an electronic-waste recycling business in Hong Kong, and exited that company around 2014.

The Edge Malaysia — The supportive venture capitalist
Andrew Tan background and education evidence summary
Evidence exhibitReported education and early-career claims, with the applicable evidence limits.

The entry point into technology investment and fundraising.

Before establishing his own venture capital firm, Andrew was described as a Chief Business Development Officer and financial-services investor at AppShack Asia.

Public professional profiles state that he was responsible for fundraising and participated in seven startup investments alongside other venture capital partners.

Working at AppShack is not, by itself, evidence of misconduct. Its significance is that it demonstrates Andrew’s experience in technology, startup fundraising, equity structuring, venture capital and cross-border business development.

Crunchbase — Andrew Tan

Regulated-sector experience before AGA.

In 2016, Andrew was introduced as a co-founder and Venture Partner of TinkBig Venture. The company was subsequently renamed TBV Capital Sdn. Bhd.

A register published by the Securities Commission Malaysia identifies the former and new names and lists Tan Yan Hoang (Andrew) as one of its directors. This relationship is therefore supported by a Malaysian regulatory record rather than only by Andrew’s self-description.

Andrew also served as CEO of CrowdPlus.asia, an equity-crowdfunding platform in Malaysia. His position was reported by Malaysian media.

Andrew was not inexperienced when he became involved with AGA. He already had a background in investment, fundraising, crowdfunding and dealing with individual investors. That background makes his duty to explain what happened at AGA even more significant.

Andrew Tan career map from AppShack to TBV Capital and CrowdPlus
Evidence exhibitDocumented pathway through technology, venture capital and retail-facing investment platforms.

His title and reputation were used to build public trust.

During AGA’s expansion into multiple markets, Andrew Tan appeared in posters, events and marketing materials under the title CEO of AGA or CEO of AGA Group. This was a public-facing role.

AGA and Gold Fun promoted an arrangement supposedly using “AI-based quantum high-frequency trading,” with estimated monthly returns of 3% to 8% and representations of low or no risk.

On January 16, 2026, Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission issued an official warning concerning the investment arrangement offered by Gold Fun and Angel Guardian Alliance Technology.

  • The arrangement had not been authorized by the SFC for offering to the Hong Kong public.
  • It was suspected of potentially breaching the Securities and Futures Ordinance.
  • The regulator had received reports of investors experiencing difficulties withdrawing their investments.
  • Investors might have little or no regulatory protection and could lose all their investments.
Hong Kong SFC — Gold Fun / AGA warning
Evidence summary of Andrew Tan being promoted as AGA CEO
Evidence exhibitPublic-facing CEO claim and the limits of the available evidence.
Hong Kong SFC warning concerning Gold Fun and AGA
Evidence exhibitOfficial SFC warning issued on 16 January 2026.

A large claim that still requires an independent audit.

A public complaint submitted by a Vietnamese investor on WikiFX alleged that hundreds of accounts associated with AGA and Gold Fun were affected, with more than US$100 million in USDT reportedly disappearing or becoming inaccessible.

A separate community-supplied estimate placed the reported Vietnam subset at approximately US$75 million, while stating that China, Japan, Thailand and other markets had not yet been consolidated.

  • These are investor allegations, not figures officially confirmed by a regulator.
  • No complete victim list, transaction record or independent audit has yet been published to verify the total loss.
  • No publicly available evidence currently proves that Andrew personally held, transferred or misappropriated the alleged funds.

Nevertheless, the scale of the complaints, the withdrawal failures and the official SFC warning indicate that this is no longer an isolated investor dispute. As the person publicly presented as CEO, Andrew must disclose the true scope of his authority and explain what actions he took to protect investors.

WikiFX — Gold Fun Corporation complaints
Unverified Vietnamese investor-loss estimate associated with AGA and Gold Fun
Evidence exhibitCommunity-supplied Vietnam estimate; other markets excluded and no independent audit published.

The expected liquidity pathway did not materialize.

During the crisis, the AGA community was directed to wait for a plan involving AllinX. The platform was expected to create liquidity or provide a way to convert or recover assets.

  • AllinX’s ANT token reached approximately US$5.04 on April 8, 2026.
  • Its later reference price fell to approximately US$0.0619 — a decline of roughly 98.8%.
  • Some market-data platforms now show extremely low or zero trading liquidity.
  • The AllinX website now displays the NEX brand and states that NEX integrated selected resources and operational data assets from the former platform.
AllinX to NEX transition and ANT reference-price decline
Evidence exhibitThe expected AGA exit did not materialize; market references and platform transition shown.

A new position while the consequences of AGA remain unresolved.

Andrew later became Chief Executive Officer of Bridge Water Trustee Berhad.

Bridge Water’s website describes him as being responsible for investment strategy, capital deployment, risk management and regulatory compliance. The company also promotes portfolios with target payouts of up to 13.5% per annum.

Taking a new position is not itself misconduct. However, it raises a major accountability question: should someone publicly promoted as AGA’s CEO continue leading an organization involved in assets, investments and risk management while investors from his previous project are still waiting for a full explanation?

Bridge Water Trustee — Core Team
Bridge Water Trustee profile presenting Andrew Tan as CEO
Evidence exhibitCurrent corporate role involving investment strategy, risk management and compliance.

The concern is the full sequence, not one isolated title.

AppShackTinkBig / CrowdPlusAGAAllinXBridge Water
  • Andrew was publicly promoted as AGA’s CEO, not merely as an event participant or external guest.
  • The Hong Kong SFC officially warned that the AGA arrangement was suspicious, unauthorized and subject to withdrawal complaints.
  • Investors have alleged losses on a very large scale, including an estimate exceeding US$100 million, although it still requires an independent audit.
  • Andrew has not provided a complete public explanation of his authority, relevant fund flows or the transfer of responsibility at AGA.
  • The proposed AllinX pathway did not deliver the expected exit, while ANT lost almost all its value relative to its peak.
  • Andrew subsequently became CEO of Bridge Water Trustee while the consequences of AGA remained unresolved.
Risk levelVery high

An impressive professional profile cannot replace accountability.

KOLcheck is not concluding that Andrew Tan has been criminally convicted of fraud. No publicly available judgment or official document currently proves that he personally controlled and misappropriated investor funds.

However, because his CEO title was used to build trust in AGA, Andrew is a key person who must provide a formal and comprehensive explanation of his actual authority, departure date, handover, fund records, role in the AllinX plan and proposed resolution for affected investors.

When a project leaves large numbers of investors unable to withdraw their money, the person presented as its CEO must explain what he knew, what he did and where his responsibility begins and ends.

Until such disclosures are made and independently verified, KOLcheck recommends that investors do not transfer money, do not participate in related products and do not rely on Andrew Tan’s personal reputation when making financial decisions.

Editorial disclosure

This profile distinguishes official records, public representations and investor allegations from KOLcheck’s editorial risk assessment. It does not make a finding of civil or criminal liability. Andrew Tan and the named organizations are invited to submit documentary corrections or a right of reply.